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Existential Risks  
Most policy work focuses on present concerns to existing people. Political leaders and 
public policy workers typically consider 
benefits over a limited time horizon – such 
as just the time before the next election. 
But some social projects involve benefits 
many decades into the future: public 
infrastructure (roads, bridges, hospitals, 
civic buildings), establishing national 
parks and marine reserves, and establishing 
treaties such as the Montreal Protocol (on 
ozone depletion) or the Paris Agreement 
(climate change). 
Sometimes we exhibit concern for the 
welfare of people beyond our lifetimes. For 
example, we consider how to store nuclear 
waste safely over thousands of years. People 
sometimes consider injustices done to past 
generations as well, through present-day 
settlement of claims relating to past treaties, 
such as the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi in New 
Zealand. 
Abstract
Human civilisation faces a range of existential risks, including 
nuclear war, runaway climate change and superintelligent artificial 
intelligence run amok. As we show here with calculations for the New 
Zealand setting, large numbers of currently living and, especially, 
future people are potentially threatened by existential risks. A just 
process for resource allocation demands that we consider future 
generations but also account for solidarity with the present. Here 
we consider the various ethical and policy issues involved and make 
a case for further engagement with the New Zealand public to 
determine societal values towards future lives and their protection. 
Keywords Existential risk, future lives, public engagement, risk 
mitigation, value framework
Matt Boyd is a philosopher and health researcher and the Director of Adapt Research Ltd, 
Wellington. Corresponding author: 14 Broadway, Reefton; email: matt@adaptresearchwriting.com; 
phone: +64223512350. Nick Wilson is a Professor of Public Health in the Department of Public 
Health, University of Otago, Wellington.
Matt Boyd and Nick Wilson1
New Zealand needs a method to agree 
on a value framework and how to  
quantify future 
lives at risk
Page 2 – Policy Quarterly
Existential Risks: New Zealand needs a method to agree on a value framework and how to quantify future lives at risk
Existential risks
Larger-scale existential risks are events or 
processes which could cause the extinction 
of the human species, or end organised 
human civilisation. These include 
widespread nuclear war, runaway climate 
change, biodiversity loss, ecological crises, 
synthetic bioweapons, superintelligent 
artificial intelligence run amok, asteroid 
impacts, and interstellar events such as 
gamma ray bursts (Bostrom and Cirkovic, 
2008; Rockstrom et al., 2009).
There is growing literature on the 
potential value of preventing existential 
risks (Bostrom, 2013; Matheny, 2007; Tonn 
and Stiefel, 2014), along with issues of 
intergenerational justice (Adler, 2009; 
Arrhenius, 2000; Arrhenius and 
Rabinowicz, 2010; Broome, 2005; Gosseries 
and Meyer, 2009; Meyer, 2018; Narveson, 
1967; Tarsney, 2017; Weitzman, 1998). In 
2014 the World Economic Forum global 
risks report made no mention of many 
human existential risks, yet the 2017 report 
specifically addresses failures in cooperation 
on climate change and the threat of 
weaponised artificial intelligence, and the 
fact that governing institutions remain 
reactive and slow moving (World Economic 
Forum, 2014, 2017).
New Zealand publications discuss some 
issues of long-term or existential risk 
management (Boston, 2017; Boyd and 
Wilson, 2017; Council of the New Zealand 
Ecological Society, 1985), but there is as yet 
no coordinated response to existential 
threats. This is despite the Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists announcing that the 
symbolic Doomsday Clock, representing 
the threat of human destruction, has 
recently advanced to two minutes before 
midnight (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
2018). 
In this article we outline several 
philosophical approaches one might take 
when valuing future people. We then argue 
that when there are several coherent 
positions available to policymakers, we 
ought to have public engagement and 
community debate to ensure sustainable 
policy responses and long-term investments 
consistent with public views. We explain 
how this might be done using emerging 
empirical philosophical strategies. The 
reason for all this is that if we do value 
future people, and we are capable of 
mitigating existential risks, then perhaps 
we ought to do that.
We then present our own utility 
calculations for the number of future New 
Zealand life-years at risk – including when 
discounting is used – although we note that 
utility calculations may not be the only 
important considerations, pending the 
outcome of the public engagement we 
describe. 
New Zealand needs an agreed framework for 
how we value future lives
Valuing future lives 
An important question shaping how we act 
today is, ‘what do we owe to future people?’ 
The answer can range from ‘everything’ 
(even to the point of overdemandingness 
on our own lives and resources) through 
to ‘nothing’. We may value the lives of 
future generations, and perhaps have 
obligations towards their well-being, or 
we can deny that their lives have value. We 
now describe some different ways in which 
a society might choose to value human 
life in the future. We emphasise that it is 
unclear which view New Zealanders take 
on average as a population and how diverse 
these views are. 
Some ‘person-affecting’ views of 
morality posit that acts can only be wrong 
if they affect someone, but future people 
don’t presently exist (Parfit, 1984). That 
said, we have little difficulty grasping the 
wrongness of imposing risks on future 
people. A ‘risky policy’ which results in 
predictable deaths in 300 years still seems 
bad, irrespective of who is actually killed 
(ibid.). It is the predictability of the deaths 
that is important rather than the actual 
people who might be killed. These future 
people would still regret our present 
decisions. However, it could be the case that 
we should give lesser weighting to the value 
of future lives through some rate of 
discounting or temporal partiality. 
Temporal partiality
If we think about the present, we may find 
that we treat different humans differently, 
here and now, for supposedly legitimate 
reasons. For example, a person may be 
praised for spending $100,000 on an 
operation to save her sister, even though 
she could have spent $100 to save each of 
1,000 starving children. It can be argued 
that obligations to people diminish 
with distance and degree of personal 
relatedness. Close human relationships 
matter in all societies and this person 
may not be condemned for saving her 
sister in this way, even though there was a 
moral opportunity cost. Heyd articulates a 
similar idea in terms of ‘solidarity’ (Heyd, 
2008). Such considerations of partiality 
arise frequently in policy discussions: for 
example, around aiding refugees versus 
investing in local people. 
It may also be the case that our 
obligations to distant people diminish 
similarly with time. This adds weight to the 
case for some level of discounting of the 
value of future lives. We may not be 
condemned if we fail to prevent an 
extinction event far in the future. 
Some strict utilitarians might challenge 
the woman who committed $100,000 to 
save her sister, because relatedness and 
distance should not matter: all human lives 
should be considered equally valuable and 
if we can save 1,000 rather than one, we 
should (Singer, 1972). Such a utilitarian 
might claim that resources should be used 
for those in the world in greatest need, right 
up to the point of marginal utility to the 
individual with resources available. This is 
a very demanding conception of morality 
(Sonderholm, 2013); however, most 
developed societies demonstrate some level 
of obligation to distant people through 
We may value the lives of future 
generations, and perhaps have 
obligations towards their well-being, or 
we can deny that their lives have value.
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various assistance programmes. But it is 
not obvious to what degree we should value 
people distant in time. 
A further problem for the temporal 
partiality position is that if we are partial 
towards the present, then it looks like the 
value of righting past wrongs must also 
diminish. If temporal partiality in favour 
of the present is permitted, then, given a 
symmetrical relationship between past and 
future, we might be justified in discounting 
reparations for wrongs of past generations 
such as slavery, conquest or breach of 
treaties. 
Actual versus statistical lives
Sometimes we discriminate in favour 
of known individuals in present danger 
rather than statistical lives at risk (Weale, 
1979). For example, intensive care units 
expend heroic amounts of resources on 
individuals. This is inconsistent with claims 
that it is generally wrong for a funding 
organisation to fund individual ‘rescue’ 
over mass prevention (Hope, 2001). 
Current prevention activities, such as 
providing clean water and sewerage 
systems, immunising a population to 
achieve herd immunity, and taxing alcohol 
and tobacco, are interventions on a known 
population, with known statistical pay-offs. 
Robust research has established the risks 
and probabilities. However, for existential 
risks the issue of prevention is more 
complex, as it may involve intervening with 
respect to a less well-defined population 
(future people) for a possible pay-off (the 
existential threat may or may not occur). 
Furthermore, we are more uncertain of 
the needs of future people. They may be 
very much more wealthy than we are now, 
with technology we can’t imagine. This 
uncertainty around the commitment of 
resources to avoid an existential risk may 
also justify some discounting of the value 
of future lives.
However, human life is a qualitatively 
different kind of good from other resources. 
This is in part because human lives are not 
obviously tied to estimates of inflation/
depreciation and future value as material 
goods are. Therefore, there seem to be no 
good reasons to prefer one discount rate 
over another. Indeed, most authors writing 
on intergenerational justice seem opposed 
to discounting future lives (Matheny, 2007; 
Gooseries and Meyer, 2009). The 
consideration of whether to apply a 
discount rate, and what the rate should be, 
is important in this context, because the 
choice among discount rates will have 
significant implications on calculated value 
when we are looking far to the future. 
Fairness about existence 
Equity or fairness considerations are 
often used in conjunction with utility 
when determining policy. Rawlsian 
considerations of justice apply a fairness 
principle and offer us a social contract 
under a ‘veil of ignorance’ to illustrate the 
uncertainty, prior to our existence, of our 
circumstances (male or female, privileged 
or not privileged, and so on). According to 
this argument, we should construct society 
so that circumstances are fair regardless 
of who we are (Rawls, 1971). Of course, 
ignorance applies to when we exist as well. 
Under such terms, creating a safe 
environment for everyone presently and 
maintaining this level of welfare for future 
people would constitute fair policy. Such 
considerations have been used to argue for 
moderation of present resource use and 
environmental protection (Norton, 1989). 
If fairness demands that we protect a 
present person’s future life-years 
irrespective of social circumstances (for 
example, through healthcare provision), 
then this ought to apply to future people 
as well. For example, future people might 
have a right to a life of natural length. 
Furthermore, according to some moral 
frameworks, if it is within our power we 
might be obliged to ensure future people 
enjoy levels of well-being at least equivalent 
to those enjoyed by present people. 
In general, to the extent that ethics is 
impartial, and thus the well-being of one 
person does not automatically trump the 
well-being of someone else, then distance 
in relatedness, location, and perhaps time 
will lose relevance. Additionally, most 
ethicists seem to agree that impartiality 
must be at least some part of ethical 
thinking. This is because a totally partial 
ethic is moral egoism (concern only for 
oneself), and this is not what most people 
mean by an ethical view. Therefore, we 
must to some degree consider the well-
being of those other than ourselves. It 
seems prima facie reasonable to posit that 
this consideration for others might need 
to extend beyond our own society in order 
to have fully informed ethical deliberation. 
We must at least consider lives distant 
from ourselves when considering the 
rightness of our own actions, and this 
perhaps ought to extend to future lives or 
societies as well. 
Public reason
Bostrom assumes that it does not matter 
when a life exists, and therefore we ought 
to spend vast resources protecting the 
many billions of future lives (Bostrom, 
2013). However, it is exactly these kinds 
of assumptions that we need to test at 
the level of the New Zealand population 
through public engagement. We suggest 
that the leap from ‘future lives matter’ to 
‘future lives matter equally with present 
lives’ needs close consideration. Indeed, 
Bostrom in fact agrees with this point 
when he argues: 
In a similar vein, an ethical view 
emphasising that public policy should 
be determined through informed 
In general, to the extent that ethics is 
impartial, and thus the well-being of one 
person does not automatically trump 
the well-being of someone else, then 
distance in relatedness, location, and 
perhaps time will lose relevance. 
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democratic deliberation by all 
stakeholders would favour existential-
risk mitigation if we suppose, as is 
plausible, that a majority of the world’s 
population would come to favour such 
policies upon reasonable deliberation 
(even if hypothetical future people are 
not included as stakeholders). (ibid., 
p.23) 
It is exactly the conclusions of 
‘reasonable [public] deliberation’ that we 
need. Consideration of these issues must 
precede, and will shape the use of, any 
discount rate on the value of future lives. 
Public engagement will help inform 
policymakers as to which risk mitigation 
rule is appropriate, especially considering 
that substantial diplomatic effort and 
financial resources might be needed to 
address certain existential risks. 
The human project
Finally, there is an important distinction 
between considering future ‘people’ or 
future ‘life-years’ and considering future 
‘generations’. The latter are critical 
components of the ‘human project’, such 
as the continuity of cultural, scientific 
and technological endeavours across 
generations. Humans particularly value 
these projects (Scheffler, 2013), and the 
long-term persistence of such projects 
depends on subsequent generations 
actually existing. 
In particular, Scheffler argues that we 
need future humans in order that many 
things can matter to us now. In his view the 
imminent end of our species would 
produce widespread ‘apathy, anomie, and 
despair ... and ... a pervasive loss of 
conviction about the value or point of 
many activities’ (ibid., p.40). If this is 
accurate, then the existence of people after 
we die is an important condition of things 
mattering to us now. While not denying the 
general importance of self-interested 
motivation, Scheffler concludes that: ‘there 
is a very specific sense in which our own 
survival is less important to us than the 
survival of the human race’ (p.73). 
We add that, importantly, when 
considering actual threats of human 
extinction, by protecting known lives in 
present danger we are also protecting 
future lives in potential danger.
A concept space of value
In summary, there is a range of positions 
New Zealand society could take with 
respect to future lives. These are illustrated 
in Figure 1. Once we have evaluated 
the worth of the ‘human project’, our 
uncertainty about the future, who is 
deserving of consideration, and possible 
discounting of future lives, we will know 
whether our position as a society is nearer 
to A, B, C or D. 
We can establish which of these frameworks 
to apply through public engagement
As argued above, there is no doubt that 
humanity faces a range of existential threats. 
However, it is unclear what action against 
these threats we should take, given that we 
can approach the future of humanity from 
these different philosophical perspectives. 
Various perspectives may be defensible, 
and which approach best coheres with 
the intuitions of New Zealand people is 
unknown, yet such information should be 
a critical input into decision making in a 
democratic society with limited resources 
(Bromell, 2012; Gluckman, 2011). The 
process by which decisions about the 
investment of public resources are made 
must be a just process (Daniels and 
Sabin, 1997), and public policy requires 
us to engage with diverse others in public 
reasoning (Freiberg and Carson, 2010; 
Nussbaum, 2000). 
In undertaking such deliberation, then, 
policymaking requires both evidence and 
morality. Policymakers informed with the 
best evidence cannot unilaterally decree 
morality. There is no avoiding the 
‘normative jungle’ in policymaking (Gruen, 
Kelly and Gorecki, 2011). We need a public 
exchange of reasons informed by relevant 
evidence (Rawls, 1987). The research 
question, ‘Which value framework 
encompassing future people and protection 
of the human project best coheres with the 
views of New Zealanders?’ needs to be 
explored. 
Recent innovations in philosophy 
import empirical methods from the social 
sciences, which many ethicists see as an 
important adjunct to philosophical enquiry 
(Kahane, 2013; Tanyi and Bruder, 2014). 
These methods access ordinary people’s 
intuitions to supplement the investigations 
of ethicists and philosophers. This 
synergistic method can bolster 
philosophical reasoning and offer novel 
insights, such as previously unrecognised 
distinctions (Deery, Davis and Carey, 
2014). 
Some experimental philosophers have 
gone further than seeking intuitions about 
Figure 1: A concept space for valuing future lives
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Legend: A – future life-years are equally valuable with present; valuing the ‘human project’ fits in here; 
B – only value those presently alive, but all their future years are equally valuable to the present day; 
C – future life-years are valuable, but not equally so with those presently alive; 
D – only value those presently alive, and favour life-years in the immediate future.
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abstract or concrete situations and employ 
questionnaire scales and statistical 
techniques such as factor analysis to reveal 
the structure of survey data collected (ibid.; 
Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). This methodology 
has not yet been explored in the domain of 
future lives and intergenerational justice. 
We suggest that New Zealand 
policymakers are obliged to gather reasoned 
public opinion, perhaps through the use of 
key informant interviews, citizen juries, 
hui, surveys or the like. The aim of public 
engagement is to access New Zealanders’ 
values and reasoning. Questions, vignettes 
or discussion topics should aim to access 
not just judgements about value, but also 
preferences, given the potentially large 
opportunity cost of acting to mitigate 
certain existential risks. Qualitative and 
quantitative methods could be used to seek 
reasons behind the intuitions about the 
value of future lives and the ‘human 
project’.
Utility is currently a central concern to 
the New Zealand government when setting 
policy. We see this in areas of health 
resource allocation or transport safety, for 
example. Treasury’s cross-government 
CBAx modelling tool prompts for explicit 
input of utility (New Zealand Treasury, 
2017). Although not the only measure of 
value, utility is likely to remain central to 
policy decision making. The outcome of 
public engagement in the domain of 
existential risk will determine which utility 
calculations policymakers must undertake 
when calculating the costs and benefits of 
investing in prevention of existential 
threats. (For example, should we calculate 
the number of life-years at risk of those 
presently alive, or of all future New 
Zealanders? And should we apply a 
discount rate to future life-years or not?) 
These calculations will determine what 
level of investment in preventing existential 
threats is justified. Furthermore, should we 
decide to invest in mitigation, we know that 
policies that require some sacrifice are 
more likely to be adopted successfully 
following extensive engagement and 
dialogue with interested and affected 
parties. 
In sum, we need to know which of the 
philosophical positions outlined (A to D in 
Figure 1, or variations of them) the New 
Zealand public actually hold or would 
support on further reflection; crucially this 
must include determination of Mäori 
views. We can then supplement the value 
position with evidence on the probability 
(of existential threats) and the utility of 
action (number of life-years at risk). But it 
should be noted that perverse conclusions 
are possible when considering the utility 
value of growing future populations. To 
avoid such perversity it would be wise to 
limit considerations to thinking about a 
stable population continuing into the 
future, perhaps at New Zealand’s current 
level. 
Example calculations for a possible rational 
investment in risk reduction
How many New Zealand lives are at risk?
Published utilitarian calculations have 
considered the value of all future lives, 
whether Earth-bound or dispersed across 
the universe (Bostrom, 2003, 2013; Jebari, 
2014). Here we provide calculations for the 
number of New Zealand lives at risk under 
certain assumptions of time horizon (how 
far in the future lives matter) and discount 
rate (how much more important are lives 
now than in the future). 
We don’t know which utilitarian 
position the New Zealand public would 
favour, let alone if utilitarianism itself 
would be the favoured ethical framework. 
However, policymakers, under the burden 
of necessity to act, might accommodate 
both uncertainty and consilience among 
value frameworks by applying some 
moderate discount rate to calculations of 
future lives, pending the outcome of 
comprehensive public engagement on what 
is literally an issue of our very existence. 
Figure 2 shows the astronomically large 
cumulative totals of New Zealand lives that 
are possible in the future (i.e. around 
75,000 billion (75x1012) lives for a stable 
Figure 2:  Projected cumulative number of lives lived in New Zealand for different 
time periods
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Figure 3: Annual life-years lived by New Zealanders currently alive and New 
Zealanders not yet born (1,000-year time horizon, 1% discounting)
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six million population for the expected 
remaining billion (109) years of Earth 
being habitable). Even these numbers are 
potentially miniscule compared to 
population growth if future New Zealanders 
join others to become colonists on other 
planets (Bostrom and Cirkovic, 2008).
Figure 3 shows a view of the next 1,000 
years (where we assume a stable population 
of six million New Zealanders from the 
year 2040 onwards). Our analysis suggests 
massive potential numbers: i.e. a cumulative 
total of 70 million life-years among those 
already alive (14% of the total) and 515 
million life-years among New Zealanders 
not yet born (at a discount rate of 1%). At 
what is probably an unreasonably high 
discount rate of 3%, the total life-years 
involved in this time period is still 186 
million, of which 53 million is among those 
who are alive now (28% of the total). 
A more constrained time scale of just 
100 years into the future is one in which 
some New Zealanders born recently may 
still be alive throughout and which many 
of their not-yet-born children will live 
through (Figure 4). For this period, life-
years among the not-yet-born dominate in 
just ten years’ time and comprise 81% of 
the cumulative 363 million life-years 
(discounting at 1%). 
So, no matter how we calculate it, even 
conceding that we may care only about 
presently existing New Zealanders, the 
numbers of lives and life-years at risk from 
an existential threat is massive. This is 
important, because although the 
probability of an existential threat may be 
unknown, it is non-zero. 
The probabilities of existential threats
As a simple exercise, we consider the 
following: (1) valuing a life-year at 
per capita GDP (around NZ$45,000 
(Kvizhinadze et al., 2015)); (2) the 585 
million future New Zealand life-years at 
risk (70+515 million – see figures above 
– for a 1,000-year horizon, discounting 
at 1%); (3) a probability of 0.1% of an 
existential threat occurring in the next year. 
Given these values, it would be rational for 
New Zealand society to invest up to NZ$26 
billion in eliminating that risk (though 
of course by working cooperatively with 
other countries the cost could be vastly 
reduced). Yet the probability used in this 
example may be unrealistically low; some 
estimates put the risk over the course of 
the 21st century at 25% or more (Matheny, 
2007). Indeed, Lord Martin Rees gives 
21st-century human civilisation equal 
odds (Rees, 2003).
Preventive measures are often thankless 
investments, because if the disaster fails to 
befall us, it is often not clear whether it was 
prevented or simply never eventuated. We 
need to seriously study these probabilities 
and mitigation costs (Bostrom, 2013). 
Investment in the analysis of these risks will 
allow rational prioritisation.
However, we may never be able to 
accurately measure the probability of many 
events (we need to be able to estimate 
probability, cost of mitigation and utility 
in order to rank interventions). The theory 
of ‘black swans’ (very rare disruptive 
events) (Taleb, 2007) is a metaphor that 
describes completely surprising events, 
with major effect, that can be 
inappropriately rationalised after the fact. 
History is full of high-profile, hard-to-
predict and rare events that are beyond the 
realm of normal expectations. Taleb argues 
that we must build uber-robust or 
‘antifragile’ systems against black swans 
because we cannot predict them (Taleb, 
2012). This might necessitate resilience-
style coping measures that are general in 
nature rather than attempting to prevent 
specific catastrophes (Jebari, 2014). 
Some global catastrophic risks are more 
likely in the near future than others. Rees 
has wagered that by 2020 ‘bioterror or 
bioerror’ will lead to one million casualties 
in a single event (Kupferschmidt, 2018). 
The most important countermeasure 
would be to strengthen our ability to 
contain such an incident. Nuclear war may 
also have a significant near-future 
probability given recent developments 
(Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 2018), 
while the risk of other threats will probably 
rise over time – for example, from 
superintelligent artificial intelligence 
(Bostrom, 2014). 
If we find that the public privilege the 
value of the future life-years of presently 
existing people, and discount those of 
future people, then we find a shifting 
window of value that moves through time, 
with a fairly short time horizon (i.e. only 
ten years using a discount rate of 1%: see 
Figure 4). It will be existential risks that 
have the highest probability of occurring 
in this window which we should probably 
be most concerned about (perhaps nuclear 
war). We would then be rational to 
prioritise such risks according to likelihood 
and cost of prevention/mitigation. Recent 
research has attempted to devise novel 
methods to communicate the level of risk 
by colour coding in these uncertain settings 
(Turchin and Denkeberger, 2018). 
Once the relevant risks and mitigation 
strategies (and costs) are identified, we 
must consider the present opportunity 
costs of taking action. Preferences in 
evaluating these costs and the benefits 
could be grounded in the views obtained 
from public engagement. We would also 
Figure 4: Annual life-years lived by New Zealanders currently alive and not yet born 
(100-year time horizon, 1% discounting)
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need to consider the present co-benefits of 
taking action. For example, action to 
mitigate an existential risk from climate 
change might reduce the burden of near-
future flood damage and other disruptions 
to agriculture. Ultimately, four factors will 
drive decision making: the potential impact 
(including the extent that the risk may 
really be existential); the probability of 
occurrence; the capacity to reduce the risk; 
and the cost of risk reduction. All public 
expenditure has opportunity costs, and 
ideally the different risk mitigation 
strategies will be evaluated for relative cost-
effectiveness. Even so, some may be cost-
saving (for example, removing government 
subsidies to the oil and gas exploration 
industry as one component of preventing 
further climate change). 
New Zealand is a small country, but we 
can contribute to global knowledge about 
how to define, approach and prepare for 
existential threats. New Zealand has 
previously campaigned for nuclear arms 
control and could work with likeminded 
countries to strengthen action against 
climate change. New Zealand has had 
successes in terms of governments looking 
to the longer term, including the New 
Zealand Superannuation Fund, Earthquake 
Commission and Children’s Commissioner, 
but we could go further and strengthen 
future-oriented commitments (Boston, 
2017). Once we know what New Zealanders 
think, we can engage on the international 
stage to build resilience. 
Conclusion
No matter how the number of future lives 
and life-years is calculated, the result is 
that gargantuan numbers of currently 
living and, especially, future people are 
potentially threatened by existential risks. 
Policymakers should therefore give more 
consideration to the future and preventing 
such existential risks. Of all the risks to 
things we value, some are urgent and some 
are important, and we need to focus on 
those that are both urgent and important 
(Bostrom, 2014, p.256). A just process 
for resource allocation demands that 
we consider future generations but also 
account for solidarity with the present. We 
need to establish what New Zealand society 
wants and values. We need to know what 
people think about the future life-years of 
people alive now and those not yet born. 
The philosophical attitude towards future 
people that a global community takes will 
determine the kinds of utility calculations 
that are required. There are threats that 
demand action now, such as nuclear war, 
and, as we move forward, understanding of 
our values will inform appropriate policy 
to rationally and optimally address other 
existential risks. 
1  Matthew Boyd conducted literature searches, interpreted 
the data, wrote the manuscript and contributed important 
philosophical content. Nick Wilson conceived the idea, 
performed data analysis and interpretation, and contributed 
important intellectual content at manuscript drafting stage. 
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